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1.     Problem Area 
The conflict in Ukraine is still ongoing. One might argue that similar events such as what happened in Georgia 
are also happening in Ukraine. Georgia went through a series of presidents all of which were either supporting 
the West, NATO, or Russia. Former Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, turned down a trade deal with EU 
in favor of a $15 billion bailout from Moscow. This bailout was meant to cover some of the debt Ukraine had to 
Russia. This led to three months of protests which concluded with Yanukovich being overthrown. 
Russia refused to recognize the new president as legitimate, and called the events an illegitimate coup. Later, 
in the same month, Russian troops seized the Crimean peninsula in a bloodless military action. Ukraine had 
limited relations with NATO. Former President Yanukovich stated that their limited relations should not stand 
in the way of a strategic alliance with Russia. 
One of the defining factors guiding Russia, and many surrounding countries, is the fall of the Soviet Union. The 
former multi-ethnical superpower’s fall marked the end of the Cold War and the start of what one might think 
of as the modern times. 
Even though the dissolution of the Soviet Union happened relatively peacefully, the ripples of that momentous 
event affect foreign policy even today, over twenty years later. With the sudden shift of borders and the 
creation of new nations as an event that went rather peaceful, but had a high risk of escalating into true 
conflict. With today’s current wording from Russian officials of protecting ethnic Russians beyond their own 
borders, one can see that huge displacement of people in the early 1990’s as a driving point for the crisis in 
Ukraine and Georgia. “Some 65 million of the former Soviet citizens lived outside their ethnic republics; 25 
million of these were Russians stranded in the ‘near abroad’ (the Russian early term for other former Soviet 
republics)” (Jeffries, 2004, pg. 40). 
Other than the displacement of different ethnic groups, Russia also lost a large amount of global. With the 
Warsaw Pact disbanded and the breakaway of a large amount of what had been Soviet Europe into smaller 
nation states, Russia is no longer in as big a position to dictate European affairs, as seen in the NATO 
intervention in the former Yugoslavian republics in the late 1990’s (Jeffries, 2004). In fact, many of former 
Moscow-aligned nations turned completely around and joined what had been the enemy for so many years, 
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NATO. Russia lost a nearly all of its former allies to NATO with the accession of the former allies of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999 and then the remaining former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet 
States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2004. All of those nations also joined the European Union in 2004, 
leaving Russia not only without military control, but also limited economically now that they are competing 
with the European internal market. 
The main focus will be on the new conflicts that arose in the post-Soviet era, although it will also include a 
historical perspective and a brief timeline of events from post World War One that pertain to the subject 
matter wholly. The main focus of this paper aims to find the connections between the actions and responses of 
Russia on the world stage and to where Russian motivations lie in relation to those actions. To learn and 
understand post-Soviet Russian motivation, the choice to focus on the most recent examples and how they 
relate, or disassociate, is key for a cogent analysis. What is the main motivation behind Russian aggressive 
foreign policy, as described by defensive- and offensive neo-realism as well as Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilizations theory?  Initial findings have found that each of the factions involved have their own interests in 
mind. The main factions that will be contained within this field are as follows; NATO, Russia, Ukraine. And while 
several of these individual groups' interests and goals will be examined and included, it will only be presented 
when in relation to Russia and the contemporary conflict in Ukraine.  
 
Research Question: 
With a basis in a theoretical analysis of the invasion of Crimea, can post-Soviet Russian aggression be put into 
an international theories model? 
In order to answer this question we have decided on the following sub-questions to our research question. 
Each of the questions will reveal answers to the part of the conflict that we seek to address. 
1. Can a timeline of the military actions in invasion of Crimea reveal information on Russia’s militaristic 
objectives? 
2. What did Russia gain, politically and strategically speaking, from the Invasion of Georgia and the 
situation in Ukraine? Did they gain anything at all? 
3. Do Ukraine and Georgia belong in the Orthodox Civilization as defined by Huntington? Why or why 
not? 
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2.     Methodology of the project 
This chapter of the project deals with the methodological choices made during the creation of the paper. It 
contains both the choices of theory and empirical data along with the reflections made as to which effects they 
would have on the research and its direction. Finally, it holds a description of reflections on how the theoretical 
framework and empirical data interlinks and how these have shaped the project’s structure. 
2.2            Methodology 
Due to the evolution of our project from initially taking its basis into a comparative case study between the 
invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, by Russia, and finally to focusing on comparing theoretical framework 
exclusively for the case of Ukraine, we have had to focus our work on providing sufficient theoretical material 
to cover. Since the beginning, we have had to scrap ideas in order to further our project and work with either 
more relevant questions, to take a more interesting approach, or if we found that there was simply not 
sufficient data to cover an area effectively enough to meet the scientific standard. The changes of direction 
followed new findings in our research, which lead us to new theories which subsequently led to new data. 
We realize that there is a great number of countries with an interest in the contemporary conflict in Ukraine. 
The interests, however, may differ from each other in ideology, economical gains, militaristic policies and 
cultures, but in order for us to be effective in our work we have decided to focus solely on Russia’s motivations 
and describing these through the use of relevant theoretical framework. 
The decision to focus solely on Russia’s motivations had a huge impact on the direction which the project later 
took. It became all the more important to define what we meant when we referred to Russia; if we meant the 
government in charge, the collection of parties, the population living in Russia, or if we wanted to focus on 
President Vladimir Putin himself. Leaving out the invasion of Georgia from our research did not alter the focus 
much in this case as we, in both cases, attempted to draw an outline of the conflict in question. Rather than 
changing our focus in a very different direction, it helped us to narrow down our field of research and thus we 
had the capacity to further the competition between the theoretical frameworks we had chosen to apply. 
2.3            Choice of theory 
This was a subject of some debate both within our group and with our project supervisor. Initial research into 
the problem area revealed that there were many different theoretical approaches to the problem area, almost 
all of which would lead to entirely different research papers.  After more thorough research, however, we 
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chose to settle upon describing Russia’s motivations with both a defensive- and offensive neo-realistic 
approach as well as taking base in Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. The two neo-realist authors, whose work 
we decided to work with, were Waltz (Defensive) and Mearsheimer (Offensive). While it was argued that 
comparing two realists with each other would prove for a very uninteresting debate, we felt neither of the two 
theories could be left out once we had applied them to our work. In order for the project to have another point 
of view, we added Huntington, who very much disagrees with realism and refers to culture as being a crucial 
factor. 
Before we delve further into the theories of Defensive and Offensive neo-realism, it is important to understand 
the foundation on which they both stand. Both of the two theories have their origins in the theory of Neo-
realism, also known as Structural Realism, which is, by many realists and anti-realists, considered the most 
defensible form of scientific Realism. It is a theory which goes in many different directions, such as Defensive 
and Offensive Neo-realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 
In 1979, Kenneth Waltz developed the theory of Defensive Neo-realism with a base on Structural Realism. The 
main goal of Structural Realism is to explain the international relations and interactions between states in an 
anarchistic world that substantiates the idea of ‘survival of the fittest’. It delves deeply into power politics, with 
concepts such as military- and latent power, a balance of power and polarity. One might argue the most 
important discussion in Structural Realism is temperance of goals. Do states ever have so much power that 
they might adopt a passive approach, safe in the assumptions that their nation’s sovereignty is assured and 
cannot be threatened by other states also vying for a stronger position? 
The choice of Neo-realism was made on the basis of the initial interpretation that Russia’s invasion of Georgia 
was a precedent to Russia’s later invasion of Ukraine in 2014, thus making it possible to analyse the invasion of 
Ukraine by applying knowledge obtained from its historical predecessor: the invasion of Georgia. 
In the initial research on the invasion of Georgia, we understood that the conflict was mainly geopolitical, 
concerning the Black Sea and its potential accessibility to Russia. 
However when we later decided to cut Georgia from our research paper, it might seem that Neo-realism 
naturally would go along with it, but rather than rely on the incident in Georgia to back up our theory we 
moved on to a new standpoint. We wanted to study whether or not this was an act of Russia concerned with 
its political relationship with other former Soviet states, and whether those states themselves would be 
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interested in engaging with Russia politically again. In his theory of Defensive Neo-realism, Waltz brings up five 
principles which influence the behavior that a state will have when interacting with other states. The first of 
these principles directly relates to the aforementioned idea that the international community is anarchical. As 
there is no government between states all states have to rely on themselves for survival.  Whom the state 
chooses to trust, depends on many different factors, examples could be an interest in their resources, 
protection or the alike. Allying with other states is essentially a trade-off. One state may for example supply 
another state with resources to get protection by the other state in return (R. J Art and K. N Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-
6). 
Secondly, every state’s main priority is its own security. If a state is insufficiently protected against military 
engagements and sabotage from outside the state or its alliance, everything else becomes unrealizable as the 
state would be defenseless against attacks from opposing states (R. J Art and K. N Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-6). 
Thirdly, “state egoism, not state altruism, is the credo of a state’s actions”. The state, in this assumed world of 
anarchy, is forced to think egotistically and secure as many resources for itself compared to other, rival or not, 
states for them to gain and secure power to maintain their position in the anarchistic hierarchy (R. J Art and K. 
N Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-6). 
Next, every state partakes in the oligopolistic competitive model understood as that all cooperation between 
states is limited much like it would be between firms, as each of the individual firms arguably would worry 
more about their own gains than that of the others – they will worry about the division of the gains, if it will be 
even or if it will be tipped in the favour of others (R. J Art and K. N Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-6). 
The last principle is that a moral state is impossible in an international community which is defined as an 
anarchy. There are no governments controlling states and thus there is no interstate law. There are 
transnational institutions such institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU but they, too, are used in self-
interest by their member states (R. J Art and K. N Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-6). 
Choosing Huntington might be controversial but the cultural aspect seemed an important factor to bring into 
this equation. The main point in Huntington’s work, Clash of Civilizations, was that the scientific models that 
scholars and political scientists used at the time to explain the world order were archaic and they were useless, 
since they did not fully address the new conditions of the world – the Cold War at the time. In the world today 
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one could argue that sovereignty, or governmental structures, are at a very low risk of danger. Land grabs seem 
to have ended. However our case study shows otherwise. 
2.4            Choice of empirical data 
The biggest challenge regarding the choice of empirical data was to decide with conflict we wanted to study. 
Initially we decided to work with both the cases of Russia’s invasion of Georgia and Ukraine, Georgia for a 
historical - albeit recent - perspective to be applied to the case of Ukraine. When we later found that the two 
cases were different this initial perspective that they were compatible became irrelevant - and directly wrong - 
and so we decided to remove Georgia from the equation as we found the case in Ukraine to be more 
interesting and with more literature, possibly due to the length of both the conflict of Ukraine and Georgia. 
Our empirical data is divided into newspaper articles as well as official military reports, to cover the conflict of 
Ukraine, as well as relevant theoretical literature on the various theoretical frameworks we’ve decided to work 
with. The newspaper articles are primarily online newspapers, while the literature regarding the theoretical 
framework – and that used to answer our sub questions, as well as research question – resides in books. 
We chose to use newspaper articles alongside the military reports as we found that sometimes official reports 
did not cover the entire truth, while at the same time newspaper articles did not always cloud their obvious 
interest in depicting the story in an exciting and fascinating way, such that they would sell their paper. At the 
same time using newspaper articles of course required us to be very critical in our approach with these 
because there’s an obvious risk that they could be biased towards either side of the conflict. We desired to use 
certain theories to explain our problem, I.E. the conflict of Ukraine as depicted from Russia’s perspective and 
their motivation for engaging in – and perhaps even starting – the conflict. In order to to do so it is required 
that understand the theories, explain them and apply them. We have added some of Samuel Huntington’s 
works to the literature, used his theoretical framework to help us define what Russian culture is, what 
Ukrainian culture is and if the two are similar or different culturally. We have examined manyprimary sources 
from the Soviet era which helped us define these two cultures and see the similarities and differences between 
the two.  
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3.     Framing the World 
The main component of this paper will be properly framing Russia and the supporting actors on the world 
stage.  This paper will use Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilization to frame the world in accordance with the 
theory of culture and conflict. Initial research of Huntington has found that his theoretical work works well in 
this way as it allows for opposing framework in regards to Russian motivation to exist simultaneously, which in 
this sense is the Neo-realistic approach.  
3.1    The Culture Paradigm 
There exists many paradigms used to analyze the political world. As every paradigm has its perks, so does each 
also have its limitations. Common to all, the more complex ones are the more realistic ones taking more factors 
into account, however, it quickly gets difficult to distinguish what is important from what is less important as 
the models get more complicated.  As former Harvard professor Samuel Huntington argues, all paradigms each 
have their combination of realism and parsimony. While neo-realism for one is very simple, it serves well at 
giving an overview of the political world, its actors, and their motivations; nations fighting to maximize their 
own power and existence. However, as neo-realism is very simple it sacrifices some of its realism to parsimony, 
Huntington argues, and is in this regard not sufficient in giving a somewhat accurate picture of the world. 
Therefore, a more complex model is required without falling into the other extreme. 
In Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington (1997) suggests that when observing the world in terms of regional 
cultural identities, there are seven or eight civilizations that do not sacrifice realism to parsimony, yet it also 
does not sacrifice parsimony to realism. In theory, one could create paradigms taking into account all existing 
states, tribes, ethnic groups – virtually any group of people, and reach an extreme level of complexity and 
thusly create a very impractical yet theoretically extremely accurate paradigm as seen with the Chaos paradigm 
for example (Huntington, 1997, p.36). 
In order to use Huntington’s paradigm, one must first define what a civilization is and how they might differ 
from one another. In his book, Clash of Civilizations, several definitions by different relevant authors, including 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Christopher Dawson, and Emile Durkheim are provided (p. 41). Huntington observes 
that the common theme in virtually any of the definitions of civilization is culture, and he concludes that 
civilization is culture in a broad sense. This observation meanwhile, leads to the interesting question: Of what 
does culture then consist? 
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As with civilizations, there are many definitions of culture. Huntington concludes in his book, that culture first 
and foremost includes religion and that religion might very well be the most important component (page 42). 
Hereinafter he finds that crucial distinctions among human groups, concerns beliefs, and values as well as 
institutions, social structures, language and history. It can be argued that some of these characteristics such as 
beliefs, values, and traditions are closely tied to religion, a theory Huntington applies to different situations in 
the current world as well as to predict future conflicts and outcomes of current conflicts, some of which will be 
examined further below. 
A civilization is the broadest cultural entity that encompasses many different cultures at different levels within 
itself, however, all levels have something in common that makes the civilization unique to all other 
civilizations.  This commonality can be many different or a combination of all properties that define the 
civilization. As an example, Huntington points out that one village from the southern part of Italy may be 
different from one in the northern part of Italy while they both, however, share in a common culture that 
distinguishes them from German villages (page 43). 
Huntington also points out that some values are more important than others. To illustrate, Huntington draws 
forth religion as such very important value. He explains that people who even share ethnicity and language but 
differ in religion may slaughter each other and refers to what happened in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia and 
the subcontinent (p. 42). 
The way of governing, while pertaining to peoples’ values and possibly religion is not quite the same, is also 
important in terms of a the civilization and its people’s identity. Some examples hereof would be the West’s 
free democracy, the religious Sharia of the Middle-East or Confucianism of the Orient. 
To explain the friction between the civilizations, Huntington uses a geological metaphor. As plate tectonics, 
fault lines ensue between the civilizations, and as Huntington predicts, it will be in these cultural differences 
future conflicts will arise in the Post-Cold War world. 
As realist theory depicts, nations (read: civilizations) form alliances if needed in attempt to maximize its power. 
In its selection of possible allies, civilizations look for other civilizations somewhat similar to themselves in 
terms of religion, way of governing (etc.) as mention before mentioned. Civilizations select allies among those 
it find trustworthy and whose intentions it can appreciate, according to Huntington. 
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Scholars still debate on which major civilizations exist in the Post-Cold War world. Huntington refers specifically 
to the work of Matthew Melko in Nature of Civilizations. 
After reviewing the literature, Melko concludes that ‘reasonable agreement’ exists on at least the following 
civilizations: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox Western, and Latin American as major civilizations while 
finding it useful to add Orthodox Latin American, and possibly, African civilizations (p. 45). 
In the world today, the sovereignty or governmental structures are at a low risks of danger. Land grabs have 
ended, and liberal democracy has flourished and cemented itself in many of the world's strongest powers. 
These new governments instead compete through trade and economic means rather than conventional 
warfare. 
Because of this, and other factors such as globalization, cultural differences have been the main catalyst in 
conflicts between people. The Cold War saw competing ideologies struggle for supremacy, whereas Huntington 
argues modern conflict, such as in the Middle East is fueled by religion, language, and ancestry instead of 
nationality or civil identity. This is a unique perspective, and contrasting to the much of the ideals of the 20th 
Century, but it explains conflict and distinctly separates it from war. War is fought between nations, and 
controlled by governments. Conflicts tend to be smaller, but are fought between individuals, institutions, or 
small groups who value their birthright, or others who share their cultural identity. The forefront of these 
conflicts are “cultural fault lines” where different cultures compete and sometimes fight against each other, 
such as in Ukraine, regardless of self-identifying Nation states, a factor that Realism mostly ignores. 
The most important factor that Realism does not include is the malleability of civilization. It only considers 
nation states and governments and their existence. Many government bodies and Nation States have come 
and go due to war, upheaval, and a multitude of other reasons however this does not apply to civilization in the 
same manner. Many of the modern civilizations are a crucible of themselves and have existed and will always 
exist in one form or another as long as humanity exists. Civilizations have merged and separated from one 
another, have waned and soared as the particulars of time passed but never fully vanished as nations and 
governments do. Furthermore, civilizations act separately from nations and governments. They act in 
accordance to their own values and do not maintain treaties, collect taxes, or build confederations with 
complex bureaucracies (Page 44). 
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The approach this paper uses will focus on the difference between civilization and nation. In framing the world 
in this way, the question on Russian/Orthodox motivation will be more readily answered in a more detailed yet 
simplified context that takes into account culture and civilization as understanding.  This understanding will 
then be proven and applied to the case study in a final segment in which Realism will not be fully able to do 
alone. The results of the case study have concluded that a cultural analysis in the Huntington framework 
provide the most likely and complete answer regarding Russian motivation as Orthodox motivation. 
4.       Power Politics 
4.1            Structural Realism 
Before venturing further into the theory of Defensive and Offensive Neo-realism, it’s important to understand 
the foundation behind Structural Realism as Defensive and Offensive Neo-realism basically is a theory 
developed upon Structural Realism by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, and Mearsheimer in 2001. Structural Realism is a 
theory developed throughout the Cold-War era and was especially popular due to its simplicity and theory 
about the world as a bipolar power structure. It also gained a lot of popularity due to its consistency with the 
USA - Soviet Union rivalry (S. M. Walt, 1998, pp. 31). The theory basically tries to explain the relationship and 
interactions between states in a world in which the strongest survives – an anarchy. Concepts such as military 
and latent power, balance of power and polarity are important when talking about Structural Realism, also 
called power politics. 
Since the world is one big arena where states compete in order to rise to the top of the hierarchy, it all comes 
down to a security competition. There is no higher authority making sure that the states keep in line. This also 
means that the individual state doesn’t have a lifeline to call upon when destruction draws near. They’re all 
alone and are therefore forced to become more powerful than it’s enemies to survive because the more 
powerful a state is the less likely it will be for other states to attack it. This is where the concept of a status quo 
state and a revisionist state becomes important as it explains the reason why the world is not at peace and why 
we constantly see new conflicts between states. One might think that peace would follow when states reach a 
balance – a status quo – but since some states might be more prone to expansionism – revisionist states – the 
individual state cannot be sure whether it’s dealing with a status quo state or a revisionist state and will 
therefore have to expect the worst in order to best survive - even from its nearest allies. This is also called the 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., 2010). 
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4.2            Defensive Neo-realism 
One of the more important discussions within Structural Realism – how much power is enough? – is also the 
discussion that splits Structural Realism into respectively Defensive and Offensive Neo-realism. In this chapter, 
this project will be focusing on Kenneth Waltz theory. It’s important to understand that Waltz developed his 
theory during the period on which the Cold-War was on its highest, which might also have led to one of his key 
ideas - that the bipolarity was more stable than multipolarity, which was in direct contrast to the classical 
realist Hans Morgenthau (S. M. Walt, 1998, pp. 31).  
Waltz theory further consist of five consequences that influence the behavior of states. The first one relates 
directly to the aforementioned idea of an international community as an anarchy. Since there is no such thing 
as a government among states, states have to rely upon themselves in order to survive. They cannot hope to 
get any help from other states because a current friend might not be a friend the next day and every help they 
might provide will only be out of some hidden self-interest (R. J. Art and K. N. Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-6).  
Second, every states main priority is the security of the state. If a state cannot protect itself from military 
actions and sabotage, every other goal becomes unachievable because the state would be vulnerable to 
attacks from rival states (R. J Art and K. N Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-6). 
Third, state egoism, not state altruism is the credo of state action. The state, in an anarchy world order, is 
forced to be egoistic and secure as many resources for itself compared to other states in order to gain power 
and maintain its position in the hierarchy. This also means that long-term goals for the good of all states – such 
as environmental issues – will always be regarded as less important opposed to short-term goals for the 
individual states (R. J Art and K. N Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-6).  
Next, every state is affiliated with the oligopolistic competitive model in the sense that cooperation between 
states are limited in the same way it is between firms as each individual firm will worry about the division of 
gains in a possible cooperation. The reason being that every states strategy and action is dependent on all the 
other states strategy and action. They are interdependent and losing in the “game of power politics” ultimately 
means destruction (R. J Art and K. N Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-6).  
Finally, a moral state is not possible in an international community based on anarchy. There is no government 
governing the states, therefore there is no law. There might be international institutions such as FN and NATO 
but they, too, are used in self-interest by the states and the laws only obeyed when found useful. A state is 
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only restricted by the limit of power it controls, it has no obligations to obey since it is not overseen by a 
“watchdog”. Basically, a state has the “freedom to choose whatever is deemed most effective to attain a given 
end” (R. J Art and K. N Waltz, 1983, pp. 4-6). 
When applying Waltz theory – the balance of power theory – it’s important to note that it is not a theory which 
seeks to explain why states act the way they do but rather it is a theory that makes assumptions and links 
patterns based on the interest of states in an anarchical international system – a self-help system. It is through 
these patterns that Waltz makes the argument that even though states act individually and based on self-
interest, their actions will ultimately result in balance whether or not that was the actual goal they sought or 
not. However, this does not mean that the international community is always at balance but it means that the 
actions of the states eventually causes balance. 
On the question of how much power is enough for a state to achieve the best possible position, Offensive 
Realism argues for gaining as much possible and in the end becoming hegemony. In this, however, Defensive 
Realism disagrees. Waltz argues that states should not strive for hegemony but instead strive for maintaining 
its position in the hierarchy. The reason being that if a state tries to maximize its power and become a 
hegemony, other states will seek to form alliances in order to destroy the hegemony state. A good example of 
this is Nazi Germany. This is basically the point that separates Mearsheimer and Waltz because of 
Mearsheimer’s theory on bandwagoning (S. M Walt, 1998, pp. 31). Instead, Waltz argues that the state should 
fight to ensure that other states doesn’t become more powerful, especially when it’s on expense of itself, by 
cooperating and making alliances with other states (Waltz 1972, cited by T. Dunne, M. Kurki, S. Smith 2010). 
5.       Offensive Neo-realism by John Mearsheimer 
From an offensive neorealist point of view, Russia could scarcely afford not to engage itself in Ukraine, 
if power or influence could be acquired. According to Mearsheimer (2001), states are power-
maximizing entities and Ukraine offered a perfect storm to Russian involvement. After the fall of 
Yanukovych, the protesters introduced a non-legitimate government that lacked a democratic 
mandate, flaring up tensions with the largely ethnic Russian community in Eastern Ukraine. Russia, 
already having troops on the scene through its naval base in Sevastopol, could easily act. Seizing 
Crimea was a geopolitical move that gave Russia unlimited access to its Black Sea ports. Now they no 
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longer had to fear a pro-western government trying to evict one of Russia’s geopolitical pieces, the 
Black Sea Fleet.  
 
Russia is now engaging the Ukrainian state by two means. To some degree by war and by 
blackmailing.  
War is a conflict between two or more states or two or more factions in a civil war. By supplying the 
pro-Russian separatists with men and material, Russia is engaging in proxy warfare in Ukraine. Russia 
is also blackmailing the Ukrainian government by threatening the use of force. Blackmailing would 
normally be seen as a superior option compared to war, as there would be no bloodshed involved, 
but seeing as Russia is already engaged in Ukraine with its own soldiers dying in the conflict 
(Antonova, 2014), the blackmailing and war strategies of Russia has been mixed together. 
(Mearsheimer, 2001) 
 
Russia is now in control of Crimea and fueling one side in an internal war between the Ukrainian 
Government and the separatist rebels. One could look at the four operational state goals as set by 
Mearsheimer (2001) to determine what, if anything, Russia has gained from investing itself in the 
conflict, from an offensive neorealist viewpoint.  
 
Every great power seeks regional hegemony. As mentioned in the theory section of this paper, global 
hegemony is nigh impossible to achieve due to the stopping power of the oceans. This means that, at 
best, great powers can hope for regional hegemony. Getting involved in Ukraine may have improved 
Russia’s naval capability, by seizing Crimea and its Black Sea ports, but it has also left NATO more 
consolidated against it. A new brigade sized NATO rapid reaction force is being set up and exercises 
and unit rotations in the central European members of the alliance, are going to be continued into 
and throughout 2015 (Gordon, 2014). Meant as defensive measures, this narrows down the 
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advantage that Russia can use against its European neighbors in diplomatic talks, as it no longer has a 
superior military.  
 
 
Great powers also want to maximize their wealth, and while the acquirement of Crimea and its 
industries and ports provide some small initial boost to Russia, the real value is in the oil now within 
the reach of Russia after a shift in maritime borders. Trillions of dollars of oil now lie in Russian 
claimed seas, and that keeps Ukraine under the influence of Russia’s energy exports (Broad, 2014). 
However, the repercussions and sanctions from the European Union, the United States and the rest of 
the west may outweigh the gain in natural resources. Further banning the import of some western 
products have only made matters worse, and Russia’s economy is now heading into recession 
(Rapoza, 2014). These are not only results of the involvement in Ukrainian matters, but the choice to 
involve themselves has antagonized the west and their markets. 
 
A great power wants to maximize its military power, primarily by achieving superior land power.  
Russia’s annexation of Crimea gave it unlimited access to the naval base in Sevastopol. Already the 
home of the Black Sea Fleet before the annexation, Russia now does not need to worry itself about an 
end to the lease treaty that was previously set to expire in 2042. With a modernization program of 
the Russian Navy underway, the Black Sea Fleet could go from being an aged formation, to one that 
could extend Russian influence well into the Mediterranean and Indian seas. The Black Sea Fleet has 
already been used to varying extent in the 2008 war against Georgia and more recently, as an escort 
for resupply missions to the Syrian Government in the ongoing Syrian Civil War. With an expanded 
Black Sea Fleet and stronger air defense capabilities from the Kacha and Gvardai air bases, Russia 
stands to gain a much stronger southern front, militarily speaking (Schwarz, 2014). The acquirement 
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of Crimea, however, has not increased the power of the Russian land forces, and therefore the value 
of Crimea is less, according to Offensive Neorealism.  
 
Finally, a great power wants to retain a nuclear superiority over its rival great powers. However, as 
neither Ukraine nor Crimea is controlling nuclear arsenals, systems, influencing tactics or doctrine, the 
point is rendered moot, as Russia’s involvement did not improve its nuclear superiority.  
 
So an improved military capability and an increase in natural resources in return for an economy 
headed for recession. Speaking of the pure offensive neorealist goals, one could argue that Russia 
underestimated the repercussions their power maximization would cause for themselves, and simply 
overplayed their hand. Even so, the seizure and integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation 
finished back in march 2014, and Russian involvement in Ukraine has continued well past that. 
Considering that the boost to  both their naval and air forces are centered around Crimean bases, and 
that the natural resources were tied to the newly acquired Crimean coastline, the military and 
economic gains does not clearly explain the continued Russian involvement in Eastern 
Ukraine.                                                                                                                                
6.       Ukraine Crisis 
6.1 Introduction 
This portion of the paper focuses on the conflict between Ukraine and Russia that started in 2014. The conflict 
in Ukraine has many intricate components that have profound effects on international relations and the 
stability of the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Due to protests, civil unrest, and power politics, the situation has 
become difficult and somewhat muddled to understand. In the following text, the aim of the paper is to 
explore in detail the major events that contributed and led to the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. 
 Even though there have been peace talks during the Poroshenko administration with Russia and the 
international community has made political moves to try and deter Russia’s actions and a continuing effort to 
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push Ukraine towards a more Euro-friendly partner. The main purpose of this section is to provide a concise 
and unbiased account of the entire conflict through to the most recent and up to date events. 
6.2 Almost a year of protests 
 The Ukrainian sovereignty crisis began when the Ukrainian Parliament announced independence from 
USSR in 1991. This parliament, known as the Supreme Council of Ukraine, was conceived during the Soviet Era, 
as a semi-autonomous branch of Soviet rule in Ukraine. The referendum passed overwhelmingly in a majority 
of the country while it saw it's weakest support in the East and Crimea. Ukraine received legitimacy as a 
sovereign nation and became an officially recognized independent state at the conclusion of the referendum 
by a majority of the world's countries. 
 By the middle of 2004, Ukrainian dissidents began to display itself to the public. The President at the 
time, Leonid Kuchma, had been previously accused for murdering a journalist, Georgiy Gongadze, who was 
investigating government corruption and the authority the government was asserting over the media. Kuchma, 
who had small electoral support in the West, attempted to push Ukraine and Russia closer together to improve 
political ties. His unpopularity was exemplified by the revelation of these scandals and his subsequent support 
of Viktor Yushchenko further increased tensions in the West. 
 In a close race, Viktor Yanukovych won the election with 49.46% while his political rival, and Western 
supported candidate, Viktor Yuschenko lost with 46.61% of the vote. The opposition accused Viktor 
Yanukovych and his party of campaign tricks, and this led to widespread public demonstrations in Kiev known 
as the Orange Revolution(Abrams, 2007). The Orange Revolution formally began before the second round of 
voting as a form of protest to the corruption that had been suspected by the voters. The etymology of the 
name comes from the orange campaign colors of Yushchenko's coalition. Yushchenko responded to the surging 
protests that followed by taking the presidential oath, a symbolic victory that only led to more support that led 
to over one million protesters at the Revolutions height, in the streets of Kiev. Several international observers 
monitored the following round of the elections and the recounting of votes ended in a victory for Viktor 
Yuschenko who became the next President of Ukraine. 
 It was then in 2010, after Yuschenko served as President of two terms that his former opponent Viktor 
Yanukovych was elected as the new Ukrainian president after defeating Yulia Tymoshenko. In office, 
Yanukovych supported and presented legislature that pushed Ukraine and Russia closer in relations. Such 
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examples include; the introduction of the Russian language as the second official language, renewing of 
military contracts in Crimea, and EU and NATO neutrality(Wilson, 2005). Allegations from political rivals that 
Yanukovych was trying to create a controlled democracy by passing a series of anti-protest legislation aimed at 
groups who wanted closer ties with The European Union. Protests continued at the famous Independence 
Square despite the newly enacted laws, and conflict erupted as the security forces violently retaliated against 
the protesters(Abrams, 2007). 
 In early February 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament acted on the belief that civil war was imminent, and 
voted to impeach Viktor Yuschenko. Yuschenko fled the country immediately at the conclusion of the 
declaration, but acknowledged it as an unofficial act, and a coup against his legitimate presidency. Russia 
offered to protect Yuschenko and helped him flee the country to Russia where he now is President in exile  
(Wilson, 2005). 
 Later in the month on February 27th, soldiers in unmarked uniforms seized a central parliament building 
in Crimea taking effective control over the peninsula. Sergey Aksyonov, a former member of the Crimean 
Ministry and a leader in the Russian Unity Party took de facto control over Crimea as it's new Prime Minister by 
claiming political solvency through Viktor Yuschenko. Aksyonov publicly asked for Russian military support in 
maintaining order in Crimea. By the beginning of March, a mix of unmarked Russian military personnel and 
Crimean separatists had military control over Crimea (Terterov, 2006). 
 
6.3 Post Orange Revolution 
After Yanukovich succeeded election as a result of the Orange Revolution Ukraine was troubled with corruption 
as well as various economic issues. The issues included the country having a very large debt along with inflation 
and lack of economic growth. Ukraine lacked foreign markets to trade with and was forced to look in two 
directions to find these, the European Union and the sovereign power of Russia. Both of the two options would 
open various trade options as well as other means of increasing the Ukrainian currency value and decreasing 
the national debt. 
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The events described in the following paragraph take place it seemed as if Yanukovich was reaching more 
towards the EU until he in the end decided to accept a fifteen million dollar bailout – to clear the country’s 
debt. This sudden change of direction, in terms of how Russia friendly Yanukovich had been in the past, 
sparked great amounts of protests and riots, later known as the Euromaidan protests. These protests, in the 
end, caused Yanukovich to flee Ukraine and go to Russia – something which left the country without a 
President. A quick succession voted Petro Poroshenko as the new President of Ukraine, something which 
Russia claimed was a coup d’état both funded and directed by the United States of America and the European 
Union. 
On the morning of February 18th, as a response to the direction in which Yanukovich was taking Ukraine by 
closing ties with Russia both economically and otherwise, a gathering of no less than twenty thousand marched 
to the Ukrainian parliament to show their anger and distress with the situation that their country was being put 
into. On this same morning the parliament was gathered to consider demands made by the opposition, a 
change in the constitution along with a change in government. This demonstration, originally intended to be a 
peaceful one of its kind, ended in a violent clash with law enforcement personnel. It quickly turned into a very 
violent and aggressive as a police barricade was set aflame by the demonstrators. Law enforcers responded by 
engaging the demonstrators with military grade flash and stun grenades, normally used in military operations 
to disable enemy personnel, and the demonstrators retaliated by throwing Molotov cocktails and bricks at the 
policemen hiding behind the burning barricades. Later the same day, when the law enforcement personnel 
engaged the demonstrators, who had then occupied the Maidan at this point, with firearms with the reason 
that they were responding with “anti-terror measures” because they were fighting people who had armed 
themselves. 
A civil war seemed evident as the then President, Yanukovich, and the government inserted anti-terror units to 
combat the demonstrators while demanding that the opposition condemn their actions – going so far as to 
indirectly threaten the opposition. This however did not halt any of the aggressive and violent protests which 
continued until the 20th. After Yanukovich fled the country soldiers with unmarked uniforms seized control of 
the peninsula of Crimea, almost directly after Russia declaring the new government to illegal and that the only 
reason they were in power was due to their coup d’état. 
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6.4 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 
The commercial airliner MH17 – Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 – took off from Amsterdam at 12:14 CEST with the 
destination of Kuala Lumpur. However it would turn out very different for the passengers and the crew – a 
total of 298 people on board – as they came close to the Russia-Ukraine border. On the ground the battle in 
Shakhtarsk Raion, part of the battles in Donbass, was occurring which would prove to be fatal for the airliner 
and its passengers. The airliner lost contact with the surrounding world about 50 kilometers outside of the 
Russia-Ukraine border, and was subsequently believed to have been shot down by a ground-to-air defense 
missile (Blom, 2014). A report concluded by the German Federal Intelligence Service found that the airliner was 
shot down by pro-Russian separatists using captured Ukrainian Buk anti-air system. 
The Buk anti-air defense system is a mid-to-long range SAM system which was used mainly by the Soviet Union. 
It is a non-fixed SAM system transported by tracked vehicles. It is designed like this to make it more durable 
and harder to discover and eliminate by enemy forces. It is designed such that it can carry and fire multiple 
warheads at a time, and at different targets, and is indeed also made to prioritize clusters of enemy aircraft 
while at the same time recognizing friendly IFF signals to avoid firing at friendly aircraft. 
The preliminary report regarding the crash concluded that as the crew had neither reported nor found any 
technical or mechanical issues the crash could not have been caused by engine failure or another electrical 
malfunction (Kellman, 2014). Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko spoke out against the crash of the airliner 
and called it “an act of terrorism” committed by the pro-Russian separatists while demanding that an 
investigation be done of the crash, something which naturally was done. The crash itself, while very tragic and 
devastating especially for the Dutch people who by far had the greatest loss counting in how many lives were 
lost, seemed to act as an eye opener for a lot of Europeans. It was very widely portrayed by various European 
news media as the great catastrophe. 
The incident was portrayed very differently in Russian media, especially so by the government-funded TV 
network RT which claimed that the plane was shot down by Ukrainian military in a failed attempt to assassinate 
President Vladimir Putin. Sara Firth, a former correspondent for RT, resigned with the main reason as the 
networks coverage of this particular incident. 
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6.5 Milan talks 
  
The Milan talks were the name of the discussions between Poroshenko and Putin under the supervision of the 
European Union from the 16th until the 17th of October, 2014, in Milan. They were supposed to clarify two main 
problems. The first of was the gas conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and the second problem was the 
question of monitoring the Donbass Region in the east of Ukraine (Rinke and Anishchuk, 2014). 
Looking at the main European gas lines, we can see that most of the gas used by the European states go 
through Russia (The Economist, 2014). of them are going through Ukraine, which supplies half of the European 
gas requirements. They are called the Brotherhood and Soyuz gas line respectively. There have been many 
disputes between Ukrainian gas company Naftohaz Ukrayiny and the Russian Gazprom, which is in charge of 
supplying Ukraine with Russian gas. It‘s one of the few business issues that became a big political problem, 
since the Ukranian politicians could be easily threatened by the Russian government by threatening to cut off 
all gas supplies 
In 2014 Russia accused Ukraine from withholding payments for their 10 billion gas debt, which Russia was 
willing to discount by 10%.  Putin agreed on a deal with Poroshenko and promised to provide gas over the 
winter, but he also encouraged the European countries to help Ukraine cover the debt (Взгляд, 2014). 
The conclusion of the Milan talks were unclear and they were not really as successful as was expected. As 
evidenced by statements by the various participants. "The talks are indeed difficult, full of misunderstandings, 
disagreements, but they are nevertheless ongoing, the exchange of opinion is in progress," said Kremlin 
spokesman Dmitry Peskov, accusing some unnamed participants of taking an "absolutely biased, non-flexible, 
non-diplomatic" approach” (Rinke and Anishchuk, 2014). 
6.6 Crimea 
Crimea is an important strategic point in Black Sea because of its connection to Ukraine and the Sea of Azov, 
which connects Crimea and Russia by the Kerch Strait. 
Crimea has historically been part of Russia. From 1783, when Catherine the Great conquered Crimea, until 
1954 when was Crimea was made part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by the USSR.  58% of the 
population living in Crimea are ethnically Russian, 24% Ukrainian and 12% Crimean Tatars (BBC, March 11th 
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2014). These numbers gave some legitimacy to Russia’s justification of the annexation of Crimea by claiming 
they were protecting ethnic Russians. 
Russian troops began to seize control of Crimea on the 26th of February 2014. Soon thereafter, the Crimean 
people voted to join the Russian Federation by referendum. 96% of the voters, voted in favor of joining Russia 
out of a 83% voter turnout (BBC, March 17 2014). The referendum was unrecognized by many countries, such 
as the United States, the member states of the European Union, Ukraine and The Crimean Tatar people. On the 
other hand China, Brazil, India and South Africa, countries that together with Russia form “the BRICS countries” 
have refrained from criticizing Russia’s actions (Kaufmann, 2014). On the 17th of March, Crimean parliament 
officially seceded from Ukraine and asked to join Russia. 
After Crimea and Russia signed the “Treaty of association of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol into the 
Russian Federation” on the 18th of March, The European Union responded to the annexation, by prohibiting the 
importation of goods and products originating from Crimea (Council of the European Union, 2014). 
6.7 Sanctions against Russia 
Many of the western states and organizations such as The US, The European Union and Canada disapproved of 
the Russian annexation of Crimea and accused Russia of destabilizing Eastern Ukraine. As a reaction they 
decided to use sanctions as a tool to de-escalate the situation. The main targets of the sanctions were those 
who were "materially or financially supporting actions undermining or threatening Ukraine's sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and independence". Also targeting “Russia’s state finances, energy and arm sectors”  which 
means that, for example, future arms deals between the European Union and Russia are banned (BBC, 
September 15 2014). Also Russian state oil firms are affected, however neither gas industry, nuclear energy nor 
space technology were targeted in the sanctions. Besides the Russian state, some individuals are also targeted, 
mostly those in Putin’s inner circle. 
6.8 The Black Sea fleet. 
Many of Russia’s interests in the Crimean peninsula lies in the fact that Sevastopol is home to the Black Sea 
Fleet. It has been an active part of Russian foreign policy for the past years and is capable of extending Russian 
influence throughout not only the Black Sea, but also the Mediterranean Sea and the coasts of Africa. In most 
recent times, the Black Sea Fleet has been involved in the 2008 Georgian-Russian War and helping maintain 
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Russia’s influence in Syria, by helping government forces with supplies and weapons, and also helping the UN 
extract the Syrian chemical weapons. 
On paper, the Black Sea Fleet looks like an aged force, as most of the ships date back to Soviet times, but it is 
still effective, especially compared to other Black Sea navies  (Schwartz, 2014). 
Looking to the future, Russia initialized a major naval modernization program that aims to be completed by 
2020, adding 24 submarines and 54 warships (Sputnik, 2014). 
One of the big acquisitions were the French-build Mistral Class helicopter carriers. They would be able to 
project power by being able to complement Russian marines and helicopter-borne forces (Defense Industry 
Daily, 2014). However, with the delivery frozen in wake of the annexation of Crimea and a worsening Russian 
economy the future of the Russian naval modernization program might be less ambitious than has been 
planned. 
 
6.9 Association agreement 
On the 16th of September in Strasburg, the European Parliament voted yes to the EU-Ukraine Association 
agreement, which includes the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA).  This agreement is 
very important for Ukraine because it provides free access to international markets, which will improve 
economic and political relations between the European Union and Ukraine. It also links the EU and Ukraine 
markets more close by annulling import duties and other import restrictions. However with specific limits to 
sensitive areas, for instance agricultural products. 
In exchange for these economical benefits Ukraine has to commit to reforms, respect human rights and keep 
democratizing the state. 
This agreement is de facto in effect, however applying the trade rules was postponed to the 31st of December 
2015.  To make the agreement active, the 28 member states of the European Union need to agree on the 
terms, which will take some time (European Parliament, 2014). 
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6.10        Conclusion (Crimean War) 
Russia acted upon its own interests when the political environment was most favorable when the instability of 
the Ukrainian government created great uncertainty in what was already widely known to be a separatist part 
of Ukraine in Crimea. Other parts of this paper have explored the Russian friendly politics and culture present 
in Crimea , and it is the conclusion of this subsection that the timeline of events in their entirety contribute to 
the conclusions of the subquestions and theoretical framework. 
In the aftermath of the incident, there were sanctions made by nations that did not recognize the Russian 
claim to Crimea. With only a few nations support what  is widely considered to be a violation of Ukrainian 
sovereignty. Matters of specific claims in regard to ethnic violations to Russian citizens are seemingly 
without merit, even though there is evidence that the native Tatar population has been victimized by the 
newly installed Russian government. 
  
 
 
7.     Survival of The Fittest 
 
The situation in Crimea might easily seem chaotic and like an unnecessary, aggressive move by Russia but when 
one starts to analyze the situation it suddenly becomes clear that it was a very calculated counter move 
towards foreign states and organizations attempt at reducing Russia’s sphere of influence. 
 In order to analyze and understand the ongoing situation, we have chosen to use Defensive and 
Offensive Neo-realism, whose focus lies on geopolitical politics and the states as power-seeking entities. Neo-
realism is therefore an optimal theory to use to better understand the external power struggles taking place in 
Ukraine at the moment. Furthermore, Neo-realism gives us a great way to analyze the reason as to why we 
have seen this aggressive tendency in Russian foreign policy and the resources they seek to gain from annexing 
Crimea, thereby enraging most of the western states. 
Roskilde University                                                                     
The international social science bachelor. 
 
Page 27 of 53 
 
Since this project has decided to use Neo-realism as one of the theories in order to explain Russia’s main 
motivation for its aggressive foreign policy, we will in this chapter take a closer look at the causes of war and 
what the invading force stands to gain from it. We will also analyze the situation in Ukraine by using the 
theories of Defensive and Offensive Neo-realism in order to gain a better understanding of the reason why 
Russia annexed Crimea and what possible outcome they might gain through such aggressive action. 
 
7.1 The Offense-Defense Balance 
 
Regarding wars, defensive Neo-realism has a somewhat negative approach to it as it claims that it will hardly 
ever pay off to be the aggravator. According to most defensive realists, there is an offense-defense balance 
that in almost every situation will be to the defending state’s advantage (S. M. Lynn-Jones, 1995, pp. 664-665). 
When great powers invade other states and take over foreign territory, it brings with it a lot of side-effects - 
usually provokes a rise in nationalism in the defending country. Therefore, a defensive realist argues that there 
is a limited amount of wars between states since a rational actor would recognize the disadvantages of being 
on the offensive side in a war. Instead, it is argued that states fight with each other through economic means 
such as sanctions. This point triggers an interesting discussion regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea since 
Russia was the offensive side of the conflict and should therefore supposedly, as a rational actor, have seen the 
overwhelming amount of disadvantages it would bring as opposed to the advantages. However, one of the 
main reasons behind the trouble it causes to invade a state is nationalism. Since Crimea has a heavy Russian 
population, it could be argued that this case is a perfect example of an invasion where the offensive side has 
the advantage and actually stands to gain something positive from it since Russia presumably won’t have to 
deal with nationalist uprisings. Actually, in the case of the annexation of Crimea, we’ve seen a Russian 
nationalist uprising in Ukraine, fighting for secession to become a part of Russia once again. So, in this case - 
the annexation of Crimea - the offense-defense balance theory is not applicable per se. Instead we have an 
anomaly which is explained by the realist behind the offense-defense balance theory, Stephen Van Evera, in his 
book: Causes of War. He argues that sometimes scenarios arise when it is in fact advantageous to be on the 
offensive side of an invasion. States can advantageously take the offensive side of an invasion when their 
chance of winning is high, when the state fears its power is declining, when it’s advantageous to be the one 
who acts first, when the potential resource accumulation is high, and when conquest is easy (S. V. Evera, 1999, 
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pp. 255-258). Taking the case of Russia’s annexation of Ukraine and applying Stephen Van Evera’s theory, gives 
an interesting view on the conflict and why Russia decided to invade. 
Firstly, seeing the fact that Russia’s military power is a lot stronger opposed to Ukraine’s is a quite good 
indication of how their chance of winning the war is. Of course one has to take into consideration that Ukraine 
was supported by several different actors but in the end it made no difference as they didn’t have enough time 
to give proper support because Russian forces moved first. 
Secondly, an argument can be made that Russia’s power was in decline and has been doing so since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it can be argued that UN and the US were trying to put pressure on 
Russia concerning Russia’s poisition in the World in terms of power by turning Ukraine, Russia’s ally, towards a 
more pro-western government and trying to enroll them into NATO.  
Thirdly, in the case of the invasion of Crimea, it was Russia who took initiative and moved first. In this way, 
Russia surprised most of the western world by annexing Crimea and causing chaos in Ukraine, before any 
outside benefactor had any chance of giving offering the necessary support to the Ukrainian government in 
order to stop Russia.  
Fourthly, the potential yield of resources by Russia especially amounts in the major port Sevastopol, in Crimea, 
giving further access to the Black Sea and thereby a larger fleet as well as the huge oil depots recently found in 
the Black Sea (Broad, 2014). Politically, Russia destabilized Ukraine thereby making sure Ukraine didn’t become 
a part of EU or NATO as well as maintaining its position as regional hegemony. Furthermore, President Vladimir 
Putin gained a major boost in his popularity among the Russian population.  
Fifthly, the annexation of Crimea was not a regular invasion by Russia but rather proxy warfare in the sense 
that Russia did not openly participate in the armed conflicts which arose in Ukraine. Instead they supported the 
Russian separatist in Ukraine with resources consisting of both weapons and Russian soldiers disguised as 
rebels (U.S Department of State, 2014). Therefore, Russia actually managed to annex Crimea without actively 
participating in the conflict, which, to this group, indicates that Russia had a very easy conquest. Furthermore, 
the Russian forces were actually supported by most of the Russian population, causing severe problems with 
Russian nationalist uprisings, which is still occupying parts of Ukraine. 
 Stephen Van Evera further argues that while Structural Realism is on point with its power politics 
theory, its theory on the causes of war is slightly off as they focus on the wrong aspects of the theory - or the 
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weak ideas as he calls them (S. V. Evera, 1999, pp. 256). He argues that instead of maintaining a strong focus on 
the ideas of bipolar and multipolar structural relations we should instead focus on the weaker ideas, which 
have been neglected to some degree. These ideas have already been elaborated on earlier but basically consist 
of the advantages of moving first, windows of opportunity, the size of the possible resource outcome, and 
most importantly the ease of conquest (S. V. Evera, 1999, pp. 255-258). 
 While the necessity of theory developed upon bipolar and multipolar structural relations is definitely 
relevant and important in order to explain the amount and types of conflicts that arise at the different periods 
that we’re in either a bipolar or multipolar structured world, it is clear to this group that Stephen Van Evera’s 
arguments and theory are highly relevant especially when going more in-depth with independent situations 
such as the annexation of Crimea. 
So basically the case of Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a perfect example of the offensive side having the 
advantage as argued by Stephen Van Evera, giving reason to why the offense-defense balance theory is not 
exactly applicable in this situation but rather that it’s applicable with the theory, also developed by Stephen 
Van Evera, arguing that other ideas such as moving first and the ease of conquest are what determines the 
causes of war and more importantly, for this project, why Russia decided to invade and annex Crimea. And so, 
this discussion clearly shows that the reason behind the invasion and annexation of Crimea by Russia, is due to 
an window of opportunity that presented itself to Russia, which lead to an easy conquest that could yield a 
high outcome of resources, maintain its own position in the global hierarchy, but also resist the US's attempt at 
diminishing Russia’s security sphere. 
 
7.2 Russian Self-Help 
 
So far it has been established that all the five requirements, argued by Stephen Van Evera, for having an easy 
conquest and thereby not be influenced by the offense-defense balance theory, was in fact present during 
Russia’s annexation of Ukraine but it has not yet touched the subject of why the annexation happened. 
As mentioned before, Defensive Neo-realism argues that the goal of a state is to provide security, maintain its 
position in the global hierarchy and prevent other states from advancing in said hierarchy. Therefore, to gain 
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some insight as to why Russia annexed Crimea, one will have to look at other states and organizations actions 
towards Russia. In this case, NATO, EU and the US play an interesting role. Shortly before Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea, they were supporting a pro-western demonstration against the current government, which ended 
with the current government being replaced by a non-legitimate, pro-western government. Furthermore, the 
West was pushing very hard for the enrollment of Ukraine into NATO and EU because they knew it would 
remove Ukraine as Russia’s prime buffer against the West and thereby putting a lot of pressure on Russia. In 
order for Russia to maintain its position in the global hierarchy as well as maintain a strong security towards 
military actions and sabotage, Russia had to make a strong counter move. Putin’s move came in the form of 
Russian-backed separatists in Crimea and southeast Ukraine thereby destabilizing the whole of Ukraine and 
annexing Crimea. This move effectively made Ukraine’s enrollment into NATO and EU a lot more difficult 
because Ukraine currently is too unstable to enter either (International Business Times, 2014). Also, for EU to 
get Ukraine up and running again can prove to be an expensive affair and take several years.  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
Overall, Russia effectively secured its position. It can therefore be argued that the reason behind Russia’s 
sudden aggressive foreign policy was a direct result of NATO and EU’s attempt to enroll Ukraine, thereby 
putting pressure on Russia. Because the global community is an anarchy and a self-help system, Russia was 
forced to take drastic actions in order to secure itself against the West's attempts to undermine Russia’s 
position. To further prove this point, it can actually be argued that the invasion of Georgia is a complete similar 
case because NATO also tried to enroll Georgia shortly before Russia decided to roll in its tanks. 
In the end Russia gained a whole lot out of the situation politically, both positively and negatively. The positive 
outcome comes in various forms. First of all, Russia defended their position from western states and came out 
on top, looking stronger. Russia has suddenly become a force to be reckoned with and has certainly come a 
long way since the fall of the Soviet Union but maybe more importantly, the annexation of Crimea showed the 
rest of the world exactly that they’re worth taking serious. Moreover, the fact that Russia annexed Crimea 
without any serious repercussions from NATO, UN, EU, or USA aside for some sanctions shows the rest of the 
global community that organizations such as NATO and FN are fairly powerless and do not posses the ability to 
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make any larger difference. Also, the Russian population has become extremely supportive of President 
Vladimir Putin and his foreign policy since the annexation of Crimea, which is not to be underestimated 
(Levada, 2014). On the negative side, one disadvantage can be argued to have spurred from Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea: Ukraine with a more western-friendly government with a president and population that 
have taken a big step away from Russian influence. Not to say that Ukraine is not influenced by Russia – and 
especially the gas it provides – because they definitely still are, but Russia is now closer to NATO and EU in the 
sense that it no longer has a pro-Russian Ukraine as a buffer nation against the West, which might provide for 
one of the reasons towards the increased show of military power Russia is putting on these days. Furthermore, 
although we will not go into depth with the economical aspects of the situation, it has to be mentioned that 
the combination of trading sanctions ensued by most Western states, a low oil price and a record low ruble 
towards the high dollar is having its impact on the Russian economy as well (Rapoza, 2014).  
 
8. Power-Maximization 
  
 From an offensive neo-realist point of view, Russia could scarcely afford not to engage itself in Ukraine, 
if power or influence could be acquired. According to Mearsheimer (2001), states are power-maximizing 
entities and Ukraine offered a perfect storm to Russian involvement. After the fall of Yanukovych, the 
protesters introduced a non-legitimate government that lacked a democratic mandate, flaring up tensions with 
the largely ethnic Russian community in Eastern Ukraine. Russia, already having troops on the scene through its 
naval base in Sevastopol, could easily act. Seizing Crimea was a geopolitical move that gave Russia unlimited 
access to its Black Sea ports. Now they no longer had to fear a pro-western government trying to evict one of 
Russia’s geopolitical pieces, the Black Sea Fleet. 
Russia is now engaging the Ukrainian state in two ways. To some degree by war and to some degree by 
blackmailing. 
War is a conflict between two or more states or two or more factions in a civil war. By supplying the pro-
Russian separatists with soldiers and materiel, Russia is engaging in proxy warfare in Ukraine. Russia is also 
blackmailing the Ukrainian government by threatening the use of force. Blackmailing would normally be seen 
as a superior option compared to war, as there would be no blood shed, but seeing as Russia is already 
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engaged in Ukraine with its own soldiers dying in the conflict (Antonova, 2014), the blackmailing and war 
strategies of Russia have been mixed together (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
Russia is now in control of Crimea and fueling one side in an internal war between the Ukrainian Government 
and the separatist rebels. One could look at the four operational state goals as set by Mearsheimer (2001) to 
determine what, if anything, Russia has gained from engaging in the conflict, from an offensive neo-realist 
viewpoint. 
Every great power seeks regional hegemony. As mentioned in the theory section of this paper, global 
hegemony is nigh impossible to achieve due to the stopping power of the oceans. This means that, at best, 
great powers can hope for regional hegemony. Getting involved in Ukraine may have improved Russia’s naval 
capability, by seizing Crimea and its Black Sea ports, but it has also left NATO more consolidated against it. A 
new brigade sized NATO rapid reaction force is being set up and exercises and unit rotations in the central 
European members of the alliance are going to be continued into and throughout 2015 (Gordon, 2014). Meant 
as defensive measures, this narrows down the advantage that Russia can use against its European neighbors in 
diplomatic talks, as it no longer has a superior military. 
Great powers also want to maximize their wealth, and while the acquirement of Crimea and its industries and 
ports provide some small initial boost to Russia, the real value is in the oil now within the reach of Russia after 
a shift in maritime borders. Trillions of dollars of oil now lie in Russian claimed seas, and that keeps Ukraine 
under the influence of Russia’s energy exports (Broad, 2014). However, the repercussions and sanctions from 
the European Union, the United States and the rest of the west may outweigh the gain in natural resources. 
Further banning the import of some western products have only made matters worse, and Russia’s economy is 
now heading into recession (Rapoza, 2014). These are not only results of the involvement in Ukrainian matters, 
but the choice to involve themselves has antagonized the west and their markets. 
A great power wants to maximize its military power, primarily by achieving superior land power. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea gave it unlimited access to the naval base in Sevastopol. Already the home of the 
Black Sea Fleet before the annexation, Russia now does not need to worry itself about an end to the lease 
treaty that was previously set to expire in 2042. With a modernization program of the Russian Navy underway, 
the Black Sea Fleet could go from being an aged formation, to one that could extend Russian influence well into 
the Mediterranean and Indian seas. The Black Sea Fleet has already been used to varying extent in the 2008 
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war against Georgia and more recently, as an escort for resupply missions to the Syrian government in the 
ongoing Syrian Civil War. With an expanded Black Sea Fleet and stronger air defense capabilities from the 
Kacha and Gvardai air bases, Russia stands to gain a much stronger southern front, militarily speaking (Schwarz, 
2014). The acquirement of Crimea, however, has not increased the power of the Russian land forces, and 
therefore the value of Crimea is less, according to Offensive Neo-realism. 
                                                      
Finally, a great power wants to retain a nuclear superiority over its rivaling great powers. However, as neither 
Ukraine nor Crimea are controlling nuclear arsenals, systems, influencing tactics or doctrines, the point is 
rendered moot, as Russia’s involvement did not improve its nuclear superiority. 
                                         
So an improved military capability and an increase in natural resources in return for an economy headed for 
recession. About the pure offensive neorealist goals, one could argue that Russia underestimated the 
repercussions their power maximization would have on themselves, and simply overplayed their hand. Even so, 
the seizure and integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation finished back in march 2014, and Russian 
involvement in Ukraine has continued well past that. Considering that the boost to both their naval and air 
forces are centered around Crimean bases, and that the natural resources were tied to the newly acquired 
Crimean coastline, the military and economic gains do not clearly explain the Russian involvement in Eastern 
Ukraine. 
9. The Application of Huntington 
                 This portion of the paper deals with defining the cultural identities of Ukraine and Russia. This 
definition is important because it attempts to corroborate with the Huntington portion of the theoretical 
framework within the paper. In doing this, this will prove that Russian culture, (ie Orthodox culture as defined 
by Huntington) and Ukrainian culture is within the same family, share the same values and identity at the 
cultural level, and hopes to provide the evidence of cultural differences as a catalyst for conflict in Ukraine. 
                 The main parts that were covered in this application of Huntington were shared history, religion, 
language, and art. During the research into these topics, particularly the shared Soviet history, the conclusion 
about how Huntington applied changed wildly. The initial hypothesis was that cultural fissures alone were the 
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catalyst for conflict in Ukraine, which provided Russia with an opportunity to annex Crimea. After numerous 
attempts to make a cogent and solid connection, it came to be that the evidence did not fully support the 
theory. Russian and Ukrainian culture are proven to be nearly identical in nearly every facet that was 
researched, and the counter culture populations had no overwhelming impact on the conflict. 
                 Huntington does help to prove why there is no conflict between the Russian and Ukrainian culture 
however, which allows this assertion and its theoretical framework to still contribute. In the last portion of this 
section, there is substantial evidence provided that suggests that the political conditions in which modern 
Ukraine and Crimea were subject to were the greatest contributors to conflict and not the result of cultural 
fissures that Huntington prescribed. 
9.1 Historical context: 
                 The first observation that unifies Ukrainian and Russian cultures lies within its ethnic roots and 
shared history. The earliest of settlers of what is now Western Russia and modern Ukraine come from the same 
ethnic group of people, the Eastern Slavs. This ethnic group migrated to this region of the world sometime in 
the first century AD. Although they remained only loosely related and scattered as lone city states in a 
simplistic federation, Rus' Khaganate, their culture and language was not distinctly different than other ethnic 
groups that also had a presence in the region such as the Turks (Khazars), Belarussians, and Scandanavians 
(Plokhy, 2006). 
                 Norse mythology such as burial rites and traditions remained highly influential even after the 
unification of the Rus' Khaganate as was noted by Abbasid chronicler, Ahmad ibn Fadlan, when he visited the 
central Rus' Khaganate in the early 10th century (Montgomery, 2000) as a part of diplomatic mission. From the 
cultural context, this region was mostly influenced by Scandinavian culture before the 9th Century as 
Christianity had not fully incorporated itself. 
                 This area was unified by the Varangian ruler, Rurik. His founding of the Rurik-Kyivan Rus' Dynasty in 
the 9th Century is a legacy shared and debated by Ukrainians and Russians even today where both sides attempt 
to hold a higher claim on Rurik and the founding of Kyivan Rus' Dynasty (Shubin, 2005). The Kyivan Rus' 
Dynasty began to Christianize as early as the 9th Century, but a formal religion for the Kyivan Rus' as a people 
did not occur until Prince Vladamir (Volodymyr Sviatoslavich) and Byzantine emperor, Basil II, arranged a 
marriage that included Vladamir's conversion from paganism to Orthodox Christianity in the late 10th Century in 
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return for military support (Kivelson and Greene, 2003). This is seen as the historical marker for early Orthodox 
religious culture in Russia and Ukraine as it pushed Byzantine culture, and thus its religious affiliation, closer to 
the Kyivan Rus' than any other outside culture had done previously. Vladamir went on to marry Anna 
Porphyrogenita, Basil II's sister, and after the wedding he changed his own non-Christian name to Basil, 
honoring his brother-in-law (Shubin, 2005). 
                   
                 Ukraine experienced many political changes over the next three-hundred years. Invasions from 
Mongolia left them a vassal state, and the rise of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began to influence their 
political structure as feudalism was introduced into Ukrainian life  during the 14th century. Poland began a  large 
colonization plan that led to many Polish peasantry settling in lands that are in modern Ukraine today when the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth repelled the Mongolians in the latter part of the 14th century (Plokhy, 2007). 
It was this settling and later settling in the 18th centuries and the time in between the First and Second World 
wars where Polish immigration into these regions was the highest. This accounts for some of the early 
settlement that eventually led to Polish and Ukrainian conflict all the way through to the Second World War 
(Plokhy 2006). 
                 As a result of this large Polish migration the political structure of Ukraine changed to support a 
Feudalist system. Those who assimilated to the Polish way, often adopted Catholicism and a more Polish 
identity. Others, mostly in the Western most region of the Ukrainian territory,  who held to the traditional 
beliefs and did not readily assimilate to the point of conflict, were known as koza'ky, or the Cossacks 
(Feodoroff, 1999). 
                 These koza'ky, revolted against Polish rule in the 17th century in the Khmelnytsky Uprising. This 
rebellion, led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, ended in the creation of the Cossack nation, which is historically 
regarded as the antecedent to modern Ukraine. The Cossack State allied itself with Moscovy with the Treaty of 
Pereyaslav which brought the State under Russian Tsarist rule. The time after this union, was in reality a time of 
uncertainty for Ukraine as no central authority for the Cossack nation existed (Feodoroff, 1999). The land 
ended up divided between the regional powers, with Russia boasting the greatest influence. Ukraine's Western 
region changed possession between Austria, Hungary, and Poland through various conflicts until 1917, when it 
officially attained Statehood following the Ukrainian War of Independence in 1921(Pipes, 1990). 
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                 The historical narrative presented here ties Ukraine and Russia together. Their history is highly 
intertwined, even well beyond what is mentioned in this subsection. Other historical events such as the Russian 
defeat of the Crimean Khanate (Ottoman Empire) that led to the annexation of Crimea in the late 18th Century, 
and the addtion of other Russian lands that are not directly associated with Ukraine or the Cossack nation are 
intentionally left out as it does not directly relate to the theoretical framework. 
9.2 Art and Language 
                 The final cultural aspects which help identify the links between Ukraine and Russian Orthodox culture 
are art and language. The Ukrainian language, which dates back to Kyivan Rus' era in the 8th century is a 
member of the Eastern Slavic family, and shares intelligibility with other Eastern Slavic languages, but it's 
closest relatives are Belarusian and Polish. Although there are many competing ideas about the origin of the 
language, the most common agreement is that Ukrainian split from Ruthenian and Old Eastern Slavic languages 
and became a distinct language of it's own around the 13th century. 
                 The Polonization of the Ukrainian language happened following the Polish colonization of 
the  Volhynia and Eastern Galician regions during the 14th century. The largest influence of Polonization came 
from the influences of the Ukrainian elite who adopted Polish culture and Catholicism in particular. This helps 
explain the modern similarities that Polish and Ukrainian have in two main ways; overall common vocabulary 
and the presence in Western Ukraine where the language was not restricted or banned as it was in Eastern 
Ukraine (Rudnycʹkyj, 1966).                                                                                                  
                                         
                 The figure on the left shows the usage of Russian in Eastern Ukraine as of 2008. There has not been a 
formal census conducted in Ukraine since 2001 to give an exact figure, but this approximation shows the 
division that Ukraine is facing in regards to its national identity. As mentioned in this paper, the Soviet Era did 
not limited the Ukrainian language (See subsection on the Soviet Union.) This fact combined with the large 
population of foreigners who speak related Ukrainian languages in the West, is why there is a division in 
spoken language in Ukraine (Shevelʹov, 1989). 
                 Russia and Ukraine also share various relations to culture and art institutions. Their shared Soviet 
history, which promoted sport and competition, resulted in widespread popularity in boxing and wrestling 
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(Riordan, 1977) while Soviet created installations such as film production studios like the Dovzhenko Film 
Studio (Named after Soviet screenwriter, Alexander Dovzhenko) still exist today in Ukraine as state property. 
                   
                 Performing arts and literature follow a similar likeness in both Ukraine and Russia as well. The State 
Folk Dance Ensemble of Ukraine, a world renowned dance company, helped modernize traditional folk dances 
in between both World Wars, and their influences came from Cossack or Hopak style dancing that also has 
widespread popularity in most of the European Eastern block and Russia during the Soviet period as it was 
viewed as a triumph of culture(Author, 2014). Unsurprisingly, at the same time, Russian and Ukrainian 
literature are also closely related from the Soviet period. Imperial Tsarist Russia already censored Ukrainian 
literature before the revolution, but the censorship of fables and traditional mythology (especially Cossack 
mythology) were censored altogether in the Soviet Era and only experienced a revival in the 1950's with the 
death of Stalin (Aleksandrova, 1963). 
 
9.3 Orthodox Christianity 
                   
                 The Orthodox faith is fully entrenched within both Ukrainian and Russian cultures. As previously 
mentioned, Christianization began when Vladamir the Great formally adopted the Byzantine faith, and swore 
an oath to spread Orthodox Christianity to all of his people. This easy acceptance of faith is most likely 
attributed to his grandmother, Saint Olga of Kiev, who ruled as a regent of Kyivan Rus before her son 
(Vladamir's father) Sviatoslav took the throne in 945 (Balzer, 1992). 
                  This early and widespread indoctrination of the East Orthodox faith created the foundation in 
which modern and contemporary traditions are practiced, importantly by both Ukrainian and Russian people. 
Such examples include; symbolism (such as the three-bar cross pictured below), religious nomenclature, music, 
and religious practices. This paper will not talk extensively about the particulars of the East Orthodox religion 
such as direct beliefs, but highlights how some aspects shape the worldview of it's followers. In the case of 
symbolism, the three-bar cross represents a few religious aspects unique to Ukraine and Russian beliefs. 
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The representation of the slanted bar seen at the base of the symbol represents the denunciation of Docetism, 
the belief that Jesus existed existentially as an illusion and not really physically as a human. This symbol objects 
to the premise and exists as a reminder of suffering and the imbalance of decisions (McGuckin, 2008). 
There are many aspects of the Eastern Orthodox faith in Ukraine and Russia that differ, but all of them political 
and not cultural. There are three major branches of Eastern Orthodox in Ukraine, but the largest is supported 
by the Russian canonical Moscow Patriarchate, essentially an Orthodox version of the Pope (Shubin, 2005). 
There are two smaller denominations, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate which are mostly popular in the Western portion of Ukraine. There 
are few religious differences between these three branches and they largely hold the same beliefs, and the two 
latter are reformed churches coming after the fall of the Soviet Union (Kivelson and Greene, 2003). 
                  The similarities from the religious aspect continue on in the shared history, church culture, and 
art. Such examples of this can be see in regular Orthodox practice. Prayer using incense (Jewish by 
tradition),  acapella singing, practice of fasting, and almsgiving are all traditions that are widely shared by 
Russian and Ukrainians who practice under the Eastern Orthodox faith (Shubin, 2005). 
                   
                  In the 17th century Peter the Great, Russian emperor, launched a series of church reforms that 
would have a lasting impact on both Ukraine and Russia, the biggest of which was changing the East Orthodox 
church with the Russian Empire and and making it an official part of the Russian State (Cracraft, 2003). One 
part worth mentioning is the unintentional including of Ukrainian clergy into the Russian Orthodox church 
during this time which caused the Russian Church to be heavily incorporated by some of the leading Ukrainian 
religious authorities. The most important result of these reforms was the lasting tenure of the church and State 
as a whole (Cracraft, 2003). The break up of the Russian Orthodox Church and the State did not occur until the 
1917 February Revolution. The strong ties between church and state at this time is one factor in the anti-
religious position that the Bolsheviks, and consequaentially the Soviet Union, adopted over the course of the 
next century as religion was considered anti-revolutionary (Davis, 1995). 
                 The conclusion to this portion of Ukrainian and Russian culture is that there is nearly no indistinction 
between the two cultures. There is no substantial evidence to indicate that Huntington's theory directly applies 
to the conflict between Western and Eastern Ukraine. Other religious groups that are minorities such as the 
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Tatars in Crimea, or members of the Greek East Orthodox Church were not found to have a substantial voice or 
impact that could lead to the type of conflict that Huntington concluded in Clash of Civilizations. 
 
9.4 Soviet Union 
                 Soviet culture plays an important role in both Russian and Ukrainian cultures. It is important to 
classify Soviet culture as a separate and almost opposing culture to the traditional Orthodox principles of 
culture, but it is also important to highlight the contributions Soviet Era culture added to both Ukraine and 
Russia. The assertion here is that the Soviet culture added traditions, ideals, art, and many other aspects of 
culture to both nations while remaining distinctly different in many regards. 
                 The most influential part in this subsection refers to the political decisions of the Soviet Union  that 
led to the modern cultural conflict that is seen in both halves of Ukraine today including; the gifting of Crimea, 
the deportation and importation of non-ethnic Ukrainians to and from Ukraine, and the nationalism campaign 
that came from Joseph Stalin's attempt to strengthen the Soviet Union. 
                 This particularly unique and interesting point about Soviet culture, is that many of its leaders and 
early thinkers encouraged national cultural growth before it promoted Soviet culture, as this was a means for a 
stronger and more diverse Soviet Union (Clark/DeBrenko, 2007) Joseph Stalin mentioned this as an important 
step for the Soviet Union to take when he spoke to a group of Ukrainian writers in regards to the Ukrainian 
language: 
                                        “<....> Uniting national culture on the basis of a shared socialist content 
                                        by strengthening the development of national cultures. This is how the 
                                        question stands. This is what people don't understand. Do you Marxists 
                                        really think that a common language will ever be created (and it will, 
                                        and it won't be Russian or French, the national question cannot be solved 
                                        in a single state, the national question has been separate from the state for 
                                        a long time.)........In what language, for example, can we raise the culture 
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                                        of Ukraine? Only Ukrainian.” 
                  Stalin continued on later in his speech: 
                                        “This is why it would be absolutely incorrect, and mistaken to take a 
                                        position of neutrality with regard to the development of national culture. 
                                        ….....It's all nonsense if they think you can make completely uncultured, 
                                        illiterate people develop their labor and also use machines the way this is 
                                        done by nations where the cultural level is high.” 
-        Document 27; (Clark/DeBrenko, 2007) 
                 Stalin was trying to “lift” the cultural elements of Ukraine by promoting a nationalistic culture where 
the people in Ukraine would be proud Ukrainians and good Soviets. Ukraine, particularly the Eastern half, had 
low literacy and Ukrainian language skills as Tsarist Russia imposed bans on the language until the February 
Revolution. By promoting the Ukrainian language in this way, Stalin measurably assured a cultural difference 
that would affect the contemporary conflict (See section on languages). Stalin reversed this decision fiercely in 
the early 1930's and began a systematic reversal of policies that included executions and a major propaganda 
campaign. Although they had lasting effects, the nation sentiment and the widespread use of Ukrainian 
prevailed eventually the anti-Ukrainian language sentiment all but waned, and vanished after Stalin's death 
(Clark/DeBrenko, 2007). 
                 However, not all of the people living in Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians, particularly in the Western 
and Eastern portions of Ukraine. During the Soviet period many Russians, and poor people from satellite states 
were forced into migration to other parts of the USSR (Siegelbaum et al.,2000). In the case here, Stalin was 
trying to create new Ukrainians, Crimeans, and other nationalities by deporting them were their labor efforts 
were most needed. This provides an interesting marker for the Huntington theoretical framework when we 
consider the multitude of cultural conflicts that arose from this decision and ultimately shaped modern Ukraine 
and the entirety of the region. 
                 One such example begins with the Sovietization of annexed territories following the beginning of 
World War II. With the annexation of Eastern Poland, came a heavy flow of refugees fleeing into the Western 
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part of Ukraine (Kubicek, 2008). Western Ukraine was already largely a mix of Ukrainians, Estonians, and Polish 
people, but the influx of more non-ethnic refugees presented a problem for the Soviet Union. There were 
already massive food shortages as seen in a report written on the state of exiled Poles within Western Ukraine: 
                                        “Day after day all over our raion (Soviet administrative unit) move 
                                        starving Ukrainian peasants, collective farm members and independent 
                                        peasants alike, in strings of carts. For any crust of bread whatsoever they 
                                        part with all their belongings, footwear, clothing, or anything else they 
                                        have. When you question them, they reply: “We had a good harvest, but 
                                        Soviet authorities procured our grain, put into effect their plans and tasks 
                                        for us to the point that we were left without a pound of bread.” 
                                                                                   - Document 23; (Siegelbaum et al.,2000) 
                                                                                    
                 This situation was made worse by foreigners, such as native Poles, who were forced to migrate to 
other parts of the Soviet Union where they struggled to adopt party mindset: 
                                        “Exiles (Poles) are credited with labordays and paid on an equal footing 
                                        with kolkhoz* (*A Soviet collective farm) farmers for their work on the 
                                        kolkhoz. In the vast majority of cases these bourgeois (and kulaks) don't 
                                        do anything on the kolkhoz. Many of them arrived with enough money, 
                                        clothing, and other belongings, and some of them receive money transfers 
                                        <......> They buy foodstuffs, but they dont want to work and nobody makes 
                                        them.” 
                                                                                   - Document 92; (Siegelbaum et al.,2000) 
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                 Ethnic and cultural tensions mounted from both of these issues (plus some historical ones) 
and even eventually led to massive bloodshed in 1943 when the Soviet Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) 
committed genocide in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia on the native Polish population. Volhynia and Eastern 
Galicia were territories that Ukraine gained as a part of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and had a substantial 
native Ukrainian ethnic population. When Ukraine gained these territories it also gained a large Polish 
population (7.8 million total population added) (Petrenko, 1987) as well as those who remained in Ukraine or 
were members of the Polish exiles (mentioned in the Document 92) who were repatriated in either the first 
repatriation of Poles 1944-1946, or the second repatriation of Poles 1955-1959. 
                   
                 This has a profound impact on the modern scope of Ukraine. Volhynia and Eastern Galicia make up a 
massive portion of Western Ukraine (ca. 130,000 km2) and has a large Polish and Ukrainian population with 
strong Polish and Pro-European ties. This couples strongly with the divisive problem in Crimea (Boshyk, 
Waschuk and Wynnyckyj, 1986). 
                 Just as Western Ukraine gained a large amount of territory during the Second World War, it also 
gained a significant amount of territory, both resource dense and militarily advantageous, after the war when 
in 1954 Ukraine was given the territory of Crimea. The transfer was both symbolic and desirable for the Soviet 
Union as it celebrated the anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (an agreement between the progenitors to 
Ukraine and Russia, Cossack Hetmanate and Muscovy) and stressed togetherness between both nations (Kuzio, 
2007). 
                   
                 Another specifically cited reason was due to a lack of labor force in Crimea after the exiling of the 
native Muslim population (Tatars) to the East (Uehling, 2004). The gifting was seen as somewhat controversial 
and has been a topic of political discussion in the decades since. The main reason there have been the political 
implications is due to the large native Russian population that still resides in Crimea. Ukraine never fully 
incorporated the ethnic populations, and the main language spoke is Russian, the main religion is presided by 
the Moscow Patriarchate, and the large presence of the Russian Black Sea fleet and military installations 
destabilized the power of Ukraine. Other Soviet decisions regarding the nationalization of the Ukrainian people 
also contributed to a stronger individual state that now opposes Russia such as the Soviet Constitution (1936) 
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which allowed Ukraine to gain individual and international statehood at the founding the United Nations 
amongst others (Kuzio, 2007). 
 
 
 
9.5 Concluding the ideal: 
                                                                                                                        
              In turn, what is presented here shows that the modern reasoning behind cultural conflict in Ukraine 
stems more from political choices made during the Soviet Era than it does cultural differences alone. While 
culture can impact the politics of a nation, that is an indirect relation that the Huntington does not fully 
explore.The additions of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia where the population is Polish sympathetic and Ukrainian 
nationalist, and the gifting of Crimea to Ukraine where the population is Russia sympathetic and separatist is 
somewhat converse to the point for the cultural fissure reasoning that Huntington prescribed in Clash of 
Civilizations. 
                 
 
10. Conclusion 
While there is the suggestion that not one single theory that can be applied to this conflict alone, minor and 
multiple reasoning might help create a better understanding. The conclusion that is drawn by the team 
responsible for this paper is that Huntington's theory as described in Clash of Civilizations does not alone 
explain the problem area in regards to Post-Soviet Era Russian aggression. 
 The choice of Huntington as a basis for the framework of this theory was based on the East vs. West 
imagery suggested by Huntington in the forward of his book, and the premise that traditional theories do not 
hold up in modern conflicts. While the Ukrainian example does not disprove Huntington, it does very little in 
properly explaining the source of conflict. The politics of Ukraine and its historical narrative seem to have had a 
greater impact on the instability that led to conflict than certain particulars involving cultural fissures. 
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 Where Huntington does help in understanding this conflict is in the unity of cultures between Russia 
and Ukraine. Their cultures are too historically linked and connected through so many of the variables 
expressed in this document and a plethora of supporting literature that it cannot be fully ignored. It is more 
likely that there is a political theorist who can more adequately explain the conflict fully. 
 One consideration about Huntington that was within another topic but is worthy of mentioning here in 
the conclusion as it was discovered to have academic worthiness, is in regards to the East vs. West ideal 
between Russia and other actors such as NATO and the EU. Russia's actions can be justifiably framed within 
Huntington's framework against the United States or other major Western powers that threaten the hegemony 
of Russia as a regional and world power. 
Where the theory of Huntington falls short of an explanation, the theory of Defensive Neo-realism find its 
mark. As discussed earlier in the project, Waltz Defensive Realism theory is not enough to draw up a fulfilling 
conclusion as to why Russia annexed Crimea. Therefore, in order to give a more comprehensive analyze and 
discussion, the offence-defence balance theory has been implemented along with a theory on the causes of 
war, both developed by Stephen Van Evera. 
What can be concluded about Russia’s reason behind the annexation of Crimea, with a defensive realists point 
of view is as follows. The consensus of the foreign policy of NATO, EU and the US has been to put pressure on 
Russia through various means such as sanctions, support of pro-western governments and movements and the 
enrollment of satellite states, such as Ukraine and Georgia, into NATO. This leaves Russia in a tough situation in 
which they felt the need to do something drastic in order to fend of the western states attempt at their 
security. Because offensive actions such as invasion rarely makes sense through a defensive realists point of 
view and the theory on bipolarity and multipolarity as the cause for global stabilization or destabilization is a 
relic from a time when two hegemonies was fighting for supremacy, we have decided that it doesn’t apply to 
our project due to the fact that it deals with major geopolitical conflicts between major powers, which isn’t 
relevant for this project and therefore not the conclusion. Instead we’ve implemented Stephen Van Evera’s 
Causes of War theory, which deals with the reasons behind invasion within the framework of Defensive 
Realism. On this basis we’ve concluded that Russia had several reason to act the way they did. First of all, a 
window of opportunity was presented in the form of a newly overthrown legitimate government and the 
afterwards replacement of a non-legitimate government, thereby destabilizing the whole country. This 
provided cause and opportunity for Russia to deploy material and troops at their naval base in Sevastopol 
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making for an easy and quick conquest with the acquirement of Crimea and thereby the Black Sea port and oil 
depots as the endgame. The unlimited access to Sevastopol is definitely a huge asset for Russia as it prevents a 
pro-western Ukrainian government to seize it and enables it to deploy an even bigger fleet and through that 
increase its geopolitical sphere of influence. The oil depots is without doubt worth a lot of money but it could 
be argued that the value has been outmatch by the costs of the sanctions and low oil prices that is currently 
threatening Russia with a future recession.  
In a geopolitical perspective, Russia managed to interrupt the acceptance of Ukraine into NATO and EU for the 
time being, yet didn’t succeed in maintaining a pro-russian government. Nonetheless, Ukraine is definitely still 
within the sphere of Russian influence in the sense that it is extremely dependent on the gas that Russia 
provides. Also, not to forget is the fact that a large part of the Ukrainian population is still of Russian ethnicity 
as well as the fact that a major part of Eastern Ukraine is still controlled by pro-Russian separatist forces under 
direct administration of Russia.  
However, the theory of respectively Offensive and Defensive Neo-realism is known for its simplicity and lack of 
depth and it can be argued that, in this case it simply fails to get a more detailed picture of the on-going 
situation in Ukraine. Together with the fact that the theory of Huntington didn’t succeed in fully explaining the 
situation either, we have to conclude that the limitation of the theories we picked, in the end, resulted in a 
limited answer to our research question. 
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